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Is fair value accounting information 
relevant and reliable? Evidence from 
capital market research 
Wayne R. Landsman* 
Abstract- In financial reporting, US and international accounting standard-setters have issued several disclosure 
and measurement and recognition standards for financial instruments. The purpose of this paper is to review the ex- 
tant capital market literature that examines the usefulness of fair value accounting information to investors. In con- 
ducting my review, I highlight findings that are of interest not just to academic researchers, but also to practitioners 
and standard setters as they assess how current fair value standards require modification, and issues future stan- 
dards need to address. Taken together, evidence from the research suggests that disclosed and recognised fair val- 
ues are informative to investors, but that the level of informativeness is affected by the amount of measurement 
error and source of the estimates - management or external appraisers. I also provide a discussion of implementa- 
tion issues of determining asset and liability fair values. 
1. Introduction 
Accounting standards setters in many jurisdictions 
around the world, including the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Australia, and the European 
Union, have issued standards requiring recognition 
of balance sheet amounts at fair value, and 
changes in their fair values in income. For exam- 
ple, in the US, the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) requires recognition of some in- 
vestment securities and derivatives at fair value. In 
addition, as their accounting rules have evolved, 
many other balance sheet amounts have been made 
subject to partial application of fair value rules that 
depend on various ad hoc circumstances, including 
impairment (e.g., goodwill and loans) and whether 
a derivative is used to hedge changes in fair value 
(e.g., inventories, loans, and fixed lease payments). 
The FASB and the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) are working jointly on 
projects examining the feasibility of mandating 
recognition of essentially all financial assets and 
liabilities at fair value in the financial statements. 
In the US, fair value recognition of financial as- 
sets and liabilities appears to enjoy the support of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
In a recent report prepared for a Congressional 
committee (SEC, 2005), the Office of the Chief 
Accountant of the SEC states two primary benefits 
of requiring fair value accounting for financial 
*The author is KPMG Professor of Accounting at Kenan- 
Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina, USA. 
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Weetman (editor), Shu Yeh, and an anonymous reviewer for 
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instruments. First, it would mitigate the use of ac- 
counting-motivated transaction structures de- 
signed to exploit opportunities for earnings 
management created by the current ‘mixed-attrib- 
ute’ - part historical cost, part fair values - ac- 
counting model. For example, it would eliminate 
the incentive to use asset securitisation as a means 
to recognise gains on sale of receivables or loans. 
Second, fair value accounting for all financial in- 
struments would reduce the complexity of finan- 
cial reporting arising from the mixed attributed 
model. For example, with all financial instruments 
measured at fair value, the hedge accounting 
model employed by the FASB ’s derivatives stan- 
dard would be all but eliminated, making it unnec- 
essary for investors to study the choices made by 
management to determine what basis of account- 
ing is used for particular instruments, as well as 
the need for management to keep extensive 
records of hedging relationships. 
But, as noted in the SEC report, there are costs 
as well associated with the application of fair value 
accounting. One key issue is whether fair values of 
financial statement items can be measured reliably, 
especially for those financial instruments for 
which active markets do not readily exist (e.g., 
specialised receivables or privately placed loans). 
Both the FASB and IASB state in their Concepts 
statements that they consider the cost/benefit 
tradeoff between relevance and reliability when 
assessing how best to measure specific accounting 
amounts, and whether measurement is sufficiently 
reliable for financial statement recognition. A cost 
to investors of fair value measurement is that some 
or even many recognised financial instruments 
might not be measured with sufficient precision to 
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help them assess adequately the firm’s financial 
position and earnings potential. This reliability 
cost is compounded by the problem that in the ab- 
sence of active markets for a particular financial 
instrument, management must estimate its fair 
value, which can be subject to discretion or manip- 
ulation. 
The purpose of this paper is to review the extant 
capital market literature that examines the useful- 
ness of fair value accounting information to in- 
vestors. In conducting my review, I highlight 
findings that are of interest not just to academic re- 
searchers, but also to practitioners and standard- 
setters as they assess how current fair value 
standards require modification, and issues future 
standards need to address. Taken together, evi- 
dence from the research suggests that disclosed 
and recognised fair values are informative to in- 
vestors, but that the level of informativeness is af- 
fected by the amount of measurement error and 
source of the estimates - management or external 
appraisers. I also provide a discussion of imple- 
mentation issues of determining asset and liability 
fair values. In doing so, I also look to evidence 
from the academic literature. 
As a prelude to my literature review, I begin by 
discussing the definition of fair value used in stan- 
dard setting, and reviewing the accounting stan- 
dards issued by the FASB and IASB that relate to 
fair value accounting and have been the subject of 
study by academic research. 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
2. Background of fair value accounting in 
standard setting 
2.1. Definition of fair value 
The FASB defines ‘fair value’ as the price that 
would be received to sell an asset or paid to trans- 
fer a liability in an orderly transaction between 
market participants at the measurement date’ 
(FASB, 2006a).’ As the FASB notes, ‘The objec- 
tive of a fair value measurement is to determine 
the price that would be received to sell the asset or 
paid to transfer the liability at the measurement 
date (an exit price).’ Implicit in this objective is the 
notion that fair value is well defined so that an 
~~ ~ ~ ~ _ _ _  ~ ~~ ’ The IASB recently issued a discussion paper, Fair Value 
Measiireinents Purt I :  Invitation to Comment (IASB, 2006). 
that explicitly asks the question of whether the FASB’s focus 
on exit value for fair value measurement is appropriate and 
under what circumstances exit value or other approaches (i.e., 
entry value and value-in-use) are more appropriate. 
2Although SFAS No. 123 (Revised) requires the cost of op- 
tion grants be recognised at fair value, it is not strictly a fair 
value standard. First, amortisation of the cost of option grants 
is based on the grant date fair value - i.e.. the historical cost of 
the grants. Second, the standard requires vesting features be 
reflected in the grant date fair value estimate by adjusting the 
number of options rather than their price. A5 discussed below, 
Landsman et al. (2006) advocate also recognising in income 
changes in fair value of option grants. 
asset or liability’s exchange price fully captures its 
value. However, in practice, fair value may not be 
well defined. This occurs when no active market 
exists for the asset or liability. In this situation, it 
becomes difficult to disentangle an asset or liabili- 
ty’s fair value from its value-in-use to the entity. 
For example, the estimate of fair value of a non- 
market traded swap derivative to a bank is likely to 
depend on the existing assets and liabilities on the 
bank’s balance sheet. I will return to the implica- 
tions of this problem when discussing fair value 
estimate implementation issues below. 
2.2. Applications to standard setting 
In the US, the FASB has issued several standards 
that mandate disclosure or recognition of account- 
ing amounts using fair values. Among the most 
significant are those standards that explicitly relate 
to financial instruments. Two important disclosure 
standards are Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards (SFAS) No. 107, Disclosures about Fair 
Value of Financial Instruments (FASB, 199 1) and 
SFAS No. 119, Disclosure about Derivative 
Financial Instruments and Fair Value of Financial 
Instruments (FASB, 1994). SFAS No. 107 requires 
disclosure of fair value estimates of all recognised 
assets and liabilities, and as such, was the first 
standard that provided financial statement disclo- 
sures of estimates of the primary balance sheet ac- 
counts, including securities, loans, deposits, and 
long-term debt. In addition, it was the first stan- 
dard to provide a definition of fair value reflecting 
the FASB’s objective of obtaining quoted market 
prices wherever possible. SFAS No. 119 requires 
disclosure of fair value estimates of derivative fi- 
nancial instruments, including futures, forward, 
swap, and option contracts. It also requires disclo- 
sure of estimates of holding gains and losses for 
instruments that are held for trading purposes. 
Among the most significant fair value recogni- 
tion standards the FASB has issued are SFAS No. 
115, Accounting for  Certain Investments in Debt 
and Equity Securities (FASB, 1993), SFAS No. 
123 (Revised), Share-based Payments (FASB, 
2004), and SFAS No. 133, Accounting for  
Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities 
(FASB, 1998). SFAS No. 115 requires recognition 
at fair value of investments in equity and debt se- 
curities classified as held for trading or available- 
for-sale. Fair value changes for the former appear 
in income, and fair value changes for the latter are 
included as a component of accumulated other 
comprehensive income, i.e., are excluded from in- 
come. Those debt securities classified as held to 
maturity are recognised at amortised cost. SFAS 
No. 123 (Revised) requires the cost of employee 
stock options grants be recognised in income using 
grant date fair value by amortising the cost during 
the employee vesting or service period.* This 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 01
:23
 01
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
3 
Special Issue: International Accounting Policy Forum. 2007 
requirement removed election of fair value or in- 
trinsic value cost measurement permitted under 
the original recognition standard, SFAS No. 123, 
Accounting for Stock-based Compensation (FASB , 
1995). Until recently, most firms elected to meas- 
ure the cost of employee stock options using in- 
trinsic value. However, for such firms, SFAS No. 
123 required they disclose a pro forma income 
number computed using a fair value cost for em- 
ployee stock option grants, as well as key model 
inputs they use to estimate fair values. 
SFAS No. 133 requires all freestanding deriva- 
tives be recognised at fair value. However, SFAS 
No. 133 retains elements of the existing hedge ac- 
counting model. In particular, fair value changes in 
those derivatives employed for purposes of hedg- 
ing fair value risks (e.g., interest rate risk and com- 
modity price risk) are shown as a component of 
income, as are the changes in fair value of the 
hedged balance sheet item (e.g., fixed rate loans 
and inventories) or firm-commitments (i.e., for- 
ward contracts). If the so-called fair value hedge is 
perfect, the effect on income of the hedging rela- 
tionship is zero. In contrast, fair value changes in 
those derivatives employed for purposes of hedg- 
ing cash flow risks (e.g., cash flows volatility re- 
sulting from interest rate risk and commodity price 
risk) are shown as a component of accumulated 
other comprehensive income because there is no 
recognised off-setting change in fair value of an 
implicitly hedged balance sheet item or anticipat- 
ed transaction ? 
Outside the US, standards issued by the IASB 
are accepted or required as generally accepted ac- 
counting principles (GAAP) in many countries. 
For example, since 2005, the EU generally requires 
listed companies in member states to issue finan- 
cial statements prepared in accordance with IASB 
GAAP. IASB GAAP comprises International 
Accounting Standards (IAS) issued by its prede- 
cessor body, the International Accounting Standards 
Committee (IASC), as well as those International 
21 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) that it has 
issued since its inception in 2001. The IASC is- 
sued two key fair value standards, both of which 
have been adopted by the IASB, IAS 32: Financial 
Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation (IASB , 
2003a), IAS 39, Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement (IASB, 2003b). 
The former standard is primarily a disclosure stan- 
dard, and is similar to its US GAAP counterparts, 
SFAS Nos. 107 and 119. IAS 39, which has been 
amended several times since its initial issuance, 
describes how particular financial assets and lia- 
bilities are measured (i.e., amortised cost or fair 
value), and how changes in their values are recog- 
nised in the financial statements. The scope of IAS 
39 roughly encompasses accounting for invest- 
ment securities and derivatives, which are covered 
under SFAS Nos. 115 and 133, although there are 
some minor differences between IAS and US 
GAAP. 
The IASB has also issued IFRS 2, Accounting 
for Share-based Payments (IASB, 2004). IFRS 2 is 
similar to SFAS No. 123 (Revised) (FASB, 2004) 
in requiring firms to recognise the cost of employ- 
ee stock option grants using grant date fair value: 
As part of their efforts to harmonise US and in- 
ternational accounting standards, the IASB issued 
in November 2006 a two-part discussion paper on 
Fair Value Measurement (IASB, 2006). Part 1 of 
the discussion paper describes issues and concerns 
with the FASB’s approach to fair value measure- 
ment; part 2 reproduces SFAS No. 157. Regarding 
disclosure, the IASB issued International 
Financial Reporting Standard 7, Financial 
Instruments: Disclosures (IASB, 2005a). IFRS 7 
requires disclosure of detailed information for 
recognised financial instruments, both those meas- 
ured at fair value and those that are not. IFRS 7 
builds on IAS 32 by requiring disclosure of fair 
value amounts at the end of each accounting peri- 
od (year, quarter), how the fair values are deter- 
mined, and the effect on income arising from each 
particular class of assets or liabilities (i.e., separate 
disclosure of recognised and unrecognised gains 
and losses). In addition, IFRS 7 mandates disclo- 
sure of qualitative information relating to financial 
instruments’ liquidity, credit, and market risks. 
Regarding recognition, in 2005 the IASB 
amended IAS 39 by describing conditions under 
which firms can elect fair value measurement for 
financial instruments .5 Under this so-called fair 
value option, entities can designate, at the time of 
acquisition or issuance, a financial asset or finan- 
cial liability be measured at fair value, with value 
changes recognised in income. This option is 
available even if the financial asset or financial li- 
ability would ordinarily be measured at amortised 
cost, but only if fair value can be reliably meas- 
ured. Once an instrument is designated as a fair 
The FASB has issued several other standards with ele- 
ments of fair value recognition or disclosure. For example, 
SFAS No. 87, Employers’ Accounting for  Pensions (FASB, 
1985) requires footnote disclosure of the fair value of pension 
plan assets and the pension obligation associated with defined 
benefit plans. However, the standard requires balance sheet 
recognition of only the net of the unrecognised asset, liability, 
and equity amounts. The SEC report (SEC, 2005) recom- 
mends that pension assets and liabilities be recognised at fair 
value in the body of the financial statements. Recently, the 
FASB issued SFAS 158 (FASB, 2006c), partially implement- 
ing the SEC’s recommendation. Evidence in Landsman (1986) 
and Barth (1991) is consistent with equity prices reflecting 
pension asset and liability fair values. See the literature review 
on pricing effects of financial instruments’ fair values in the 
next section. 
The comment in footnote 2 relating to SFAS No. 123 
(Revised) applies also to IFRS 2. 
IASB (2005b). 
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value instrument, it cannot be reclassified. A goal 
of the fair value option is to mitigate the effects of 
income volatility arising from the mixed attribute 
model without having to apply hedge accounting. 
In 2006, the FASB issued an Exposure Draft, 
Proposed Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards, The Fair Value Option for Financial 
Assets and Financial Liabilities (FASB, 2006b), 
which largely mirrors the IAS 39 fair value option 
standard. Critics of the fair value option raise the 
concern that permitting two different entities to 
classify the same financial instrument differently 
will reduce cross-firm financial statement compa- 
rability. 
As noted earlier, the FASB issued Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No. 157, Fair 
Value Measurements (FASB, 2006a), which pro- 
vides a definition of fair value! However, SFAS 
157 also establishes a framework for measuring 
fair value and expands disclosures about fair value 
measurements. The FASB recognises that active 
markets may not always exist for a specific asset 
or liability, and therefore develops a hierarchy of 
preferences for measurement of fair value. The 
preferred Level 1 fair value estimates are those 
based on quoted prices for identical assets and lia- 
bilities, and are most applicable to those assets or 
liabilities that are actively traded (e.g., trading in- 
vestment securities). Level 2 estimates are those 
based on quoted market prices of similar or relat- 
ed assets and liabilities. Level 3 estimates, the least 
preferred, are those based on company estimates, 
and should only be used if Level 1 or 2 estimates 
are not available. With its emphasis on market 
prices, the FASB requires that firms should base 
their Level 3 estimates on market prices as model 
inputs wherever possible (e.g., use of equity mar- 
ket volatility estimates when employing the Black- 
Scholes valuation model to estimate the fair value 
of employee stock options). Fair value estimates 
can be constructed using entity-supplied inputs 
(e.g., discounted cash flow estimates) if other 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
models employing market inputs are not available. 
Critics of SFAS 157 express both conceptual and 
practical concerns .7 The key conceptual concern is 
that exit value may not appropriately capture the 
value of an asset (or liability) to a firm’s share- 
holders even if an active market exists for the 
asset. This can occur if there is a significant diver- 
gence between an asset’s value-in-use and its exit 
value. An asset’s value-in-use reflects manage- 
ment skill as well as how the asset is used in con- 
junction with other assets with which it is 
combined to generate income. The key practical 
issue is that because active markets may not exist 
for an asset or liability, much of the time fair value 
will have to be measured based on Levels 2 and 3 
estimates. Level 2 or 3 estimates are subjective, 
subject to manipulation, and potentially difficult to 
verify (audit)? 
As noted above in footnote I ,  the IASB has yet to settle on 
a definition of fair value. ’ See, for example, Ernst & Young (2005) and AAA FASC 
(2005). 
Even though the goal is always, for all estimates, regard- 
less of the level, exit value, Level 3 estimates will, almost by 
necessity, have a strong value-in-use flavour in that inputs 
may often be entity-supplied rather than those based on mod- 
els employing market inputs. In addition, any adjustments that 
are made to model-based estimates to arrive at exit value are 
likely to be highly subjective. 
Bank regulators are also interested in these and related 
questions. See footnote 12 below. 
Note that prior to issuance of SFAS 157, ‘fair value’ was 
not clearly defined as exit value, nor was the procedure for es- 
timating fair values in the absence of active markets clearly 
laid-out. Thus, studies examining the value relevance of fair 
value information are not necessarily based on exit value 
prices as defined in SFAS 157. 
3. Are fair values useful to investors? 
Evidence from research 
3.1. US-based research 
When assessing the quality of fair value infor- 
mation, a natural question to ask is whether fair 
value information is useful to investors. For exam- 
ple, when it was deliberating SFAS No. 107, the 
FASB was concerned with policy questions relat- 
ing to the relevance and reliability of disclosed 
amounts. Regarding relevance, the FASB was in- 
terested in whether SFAS No, 107 disclosures 
would be incrementally useful to financial state- 
ment users relative to items already in financial 
statements, including recognised book values and 
disclosed amounts. Regarding reliability, the 
FASB was concerned with whether fair values es- 
timates, especially those relating to loans, would 
be too noisy to disclose.” 
As Barth et al. (2001) note, policy-based ac- 
counting research cannot directly address these 
questions, but can provide evidence that helps 
standard-setters assess relevance and reliability 
questions. A common way to assess the so-called 
value relevance of a recognised or disclosed ac- 
counting amount is to assess its incremental asso- 
ciation with share prices or share returns after 
controlling for other accounting or market infor- 
mation. 
Much of the value relevance research assessing 
the relevance and reliability of fair value informa- 
tion focuses on banks, since banks are largely 
comprised of financial assets and liabilities.’O 
Several studies address the value relevance of 
banks’ disclosed investment securities fair values 
before issuance of SFAS No. 115 mandating 
recognition of investment securities’ fair values 
and effects of their changes on the balance sheet 
and the income statement. For a sample of US 
banks with data from 1971-1990, Barth (1994) 
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finds that investment securities’ fair values are in- 
crementally associated with bank share prices after 
controlling for investment securities’ book values. 
When examined in an annual returns context, the 
study finds mixed results for whether unrecog- 
nised securities’ gains and losses provide incre- 
mental explanatory power relative to other 
components of income. One leading candidate for 
the ambiguous finding for securities gains and 
losses is that the gains and losses estimates contain 
too much measurement error relative to the true 
underlying changes in their market values.” Using 
essentially the same database, Barth et al. (1995) 
confirm the Barth (1 994) findings and lend support 
to the measurement error explanation by showing 
that fair value-based measures of net income are 
more volatile than historical cost-based measures, 
but the incremental volatility is not reflected in 
bank share prices.’ 
Barth et al. (1996), Eccher et al. (1996), and 
Nelson (1996) use similar approaches to assess the 
incremental value relevance of fair values of prin- 
cipal categories of banks assets and liabilities dis- 
closed under SFAS No. 107 in 1992 and 1993, i.e., 
investment securities, loans, deposits, and long- 
term debt. Supporting the findings of Barth (1994) 
using pre-SFAS No. 107 data, all three studies find 
23 
investment securities fair values are incrementally 
informative relative to their book values in ex- 
plaining bank share prices. However, using a more 
powerful research design that controls for the ef- 
fects of potential omitted variables, Barth et al. 
(1 996) also find evidence that loans’ fair values are 
also incrementally informative relative to their 
book values in explaining bank share prices. Barth 
et al. (1996) also provide additional evidence that 
the fair values of loans reflect information regard- 
ing the default and interest rate risk of those loans. 
In addition, the study’s findings suggest that in- 
vestors appear to discount loans’ fair value esti- 
mates made by less financially healthy banks (i.e., 
those banks with below sample median regulatory 
capital), which is consistent with investors being 
able to see through attempts by managers of less 
healthy banks to make their banks appear more 
healthy by exercising discretion when estimating 
loans fair values. 
Finally, Venkatachalam ( 1996) examines the 
value relevance of banks’ derivatives disclosures 
provided under SFAS No. 119 for a sample of 
banks in 1993 and 1994. Findings from the study 
suggest that derivatives’ fair value estimates ex- 
plain cross-sectional variation in bank share prices 
incremental to fair values of the primary on-bal- 
ance accounts (i.e., cash, investments, loans, de- 
posits, and debt). 
3.2. International research 
Because Australian and UK GAAP permit up- 
ward asset revaluations but, as with US GAAP, re- 
quire downward revaluations in the case of asset 
impairments, several studies examine the dimen- 
sions of value relevance of revaluations in these 
c0untries.I’ Most studies, including Easton et al. 
(1993), Barth and Clinch (1996), Barth and Clinch 
( 1  998), and Muller and Riedl(2002), focus on tan- 
gible fixed asset revaluations. These studies are 
potentially informative to standard-setters as they 
consider requiring disclosure or recognition of tan- 
gible fixed assets at fair value. Such assets, of 
course, are likely to fall into the Level 3 category 
in the fair value measurement hierarchy, and hence 
are likely to be subject to a greater amount of man- 
agement discretion than is the case for financial as- 
s e t ~ . ’ ~  
Using a sample of Australian firms with data 
from 1981-1990, Easton et al. (1993) estimate an- 
nual return regressions and find that asset revalua- 
tions of tangible long-lived assets have 
incremental explanatory power relative to earnings 
and change in earnings. Also using a sample of 
Australian firms but from a later period, 
1991-1995, Barth and Clinch (1998) estimate an- 
nual stock price regressions to determine if finan- 
cial, tangible, and intangible asset revaluations 
have incremental explanatory power relative to 
‘ I  Another equally plausible explanation is that investment 
securities’ fair value gains and losses are naturally hedged by 
fair value changes of other balance sheet amounts, which are 
not included in the estimating equations. Ahmed and Takeda 
(1995), who include other on-balance sheet net assets in the 
estimating equations, provide support for this explanation by 
providing evidence of incremental explanatory power for un- 
recognised securities gains and losses in explaining banks’ 
stock returns. 
I? Of particular interest to bank regulators, Barth et al. 
( I  995) also find that banks violate regulatory capital require- 
ments more frequently under fair value than historical cost ac- 
counting, and fair value regulatory capital violations help 
predict future historical cost regulatory capital violations, but 
share prices fail to reflect this increased regulatory risk. 
l 3  See Black et al. (1998: I,289-1,291) for a brief discussion 
of accounting standards applicable to asset revaluations in the 
UK,  Australia, and New Zealand. 
I‘ In response to concerns about the effects of inflation on 
balance sheets and income statements, the FASB issued SFAS 
33, Financial Reporting and Chunging Prices (FASB, 1979), 
which mandated disclosure of current cost information for 
tangible assets, principally inventories and plant and equip- 
ment. The current cost data are similar to revaluation data. The 
general conclusion reached by studies assessing the value rel- 
evance of the current cost data is the failure to detect, relative 
to historical cost earnings, incremental explanatory power for 
stock prices or returns for any of the alternative income meas- 
ures based on the current cost information (see, e.g., Beaver 
and Landsman, 1983; Beaver and Ryan, 1985). Reasons for 
the lack of incremental explanatory power include unbiased 
estimation error and bias arising from exercise of managerial 
discretion. Factors contributing to the low data quality were 
that the data were unaudited and subject to a ‘sunset’ provi- 
sion, whereby the disclosure requirement would expire after 
five years unless the FASB made the provision permanent (it 
did not). See Barth et al. (2001. section 2.2) for more discus- 
sion. 
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operating earnings and equity book value less the 
book value of revalued assets. Consistent with US- 
based research, Barth and Clinch (1998) find 
revalued investments are incrementally priced. 
Contrary to the view that intangible asset revalua- 
tions are likely to be noisy and uninformative, the 
study finds a positive association between such 
revaluations and share prices. However, with the 
exception of mining firms, they fail to find a sig- 
nificantly positive association between share 
prices and property, plant and equipment revalua- 
tions. Regarding managerial discretion in determi- 
nation of revaluation amounts, the study also finds 
little evidence indicating independent appraiser- 
based revaluations are more relevant than director- 
based estimates. This finding is of potential 
importance to the FASB and IASB, as it bears di- 
rectly on the issue of whether Level 3 fair value es- 
timates will lack value relevance because investors 
will be concerned about managerial manipulation 
and measurement error. In particular, the study 
concludes that the findings suggest that the rele- 
vance of directors’ private information about asset 
fair values has the potential to outweigh the effects 
of self-interest on the estimates. 
In contrast to the findings in Barth and Clinch 
(1998), Muller and Riedl(2002) find evidence that 
the market finds asset revaluations estimates made 
by external appraisers are more informative than 
those made by internal appraisers. Using a sample 
of UK investment property firms for the period 
1990-1999, the study shows that information 
asymmetry as measured by the adverse-selection 
component of the firms’ average stock price bid- 
ask spread in the seven months subsequent to fis- 
cal year-end is greater for firms employing internal 
appraisers. Muller and Riedl (2002) interpret this 
as evidence that the market finds asset revaluation 
estimates based on external appraisals to be more 
reliable. One potential explanation for the differ- 
ence in findings between the two studies is that the 
Muller and Riedl (2002) research design is more 
powerful than the Barth and Clinch (1998) re- 
search design. However, this conclusion must be 
made with caution because the Muller and Riedl 
(2002) sample of firms is limited to a specialised 
industry, investment property firms, where exter- 
nal appraisals are an institutional feature. 
Moreover, the Muller and Riedl(2002) findings do 
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not suggest that the market finds asset revaluations 
made by internal appraisers to be uninformative. 
Cotter and Richardson (2002) also find that ex- 
ternal appraisals are more reliable than those made 
by directors for a sample of Australian firms from 
1981-1994. Their measure of reliability is the 
amount of subsequent years’ reversals of upward 
asset revaluations. However, Cotter and 
Richardson (2002) also find that independent ap- 
praisers are more likely to be used for revaluations 
of land and buildings and directors are more likely 
for investments, plant and equipment and identifi- 
able intangibles. The authors interpret this as evi- 
dence of firms relying on directors’ superior 
knowledge of asset values for assets that are more 
specialised and difficult for outside appraisers to 
value. 
Aboody et al. (1999) examine the performance 
prediction and pricing implications of fixed asset 
revaluations for a sample of UK firms from 
1983-1995. The study finds that upward revalua- 
tions are significantly positively related to changes 
in future performance, measured by operating in- 
come and cash from operations. Regarding pric- 
ing, using annual regressions similar to those 
employed in Easton et al. (1993) and Barth and 
Clinch (1998), the study finds that current year 
revaluations are significantly positively related to 
annual stock returns, and current year asset reval- 
uation balances are significantly positively related 
to annual stock prices. However, regarding the ef- 
fects of managerial incentives to manipulate asset 
revaluation amounts, the study also finds that rela- 
tions between revaluations and future performance 
and prices are weaker for higher debt-to-equity 
ratio firms. That is, managerial manipulation af- 
fects the usefulness of asset revaluations made by 
managers of firms facing the pressures of financial 
distress. l5  
One reason accounting standard setters state in 
support of fair value measurement is that it miti- 
gates incentives for firms to time asset sales to 
manage earnings. If gains and losses are recog- 
nised in income when assets are revalued and 
gains on sale are based on fair value rather than 
historical cost, then the incentive to time asset 
sales for earnings management purposes evapo- 
rate. Black et al. (1998) find evidence in support of 
this reasoning. In particular, for a sample of UK, 
Australian, and New Zealand firms in 1985- 1995, 
the study finds no difference in earnings manage- 
ment behaviour for asset revaluing and non-asset 
revaluing firms. The finding does not hold for UK 
firms in the pre- 1993 period when asset-revaluing 
firms were permitted to include in income gains 
and losses based on historical cost, which is fur- 
ther evidence that mandating fair value measure- 
ment for gain/loss recognition for firms that elect 
to use fair value measurement reduces the practice 
l5  In the discussion of Aboody et al. (1999), Sloan (1999) 
states that the study’s findings are inconclusive because of the 
potential confounding effects of other variables unrelated to, 
but correlated with asset revaluations. Aboody et al. (1999) do 
include several controls for such omitted variables, although it 
is never possible to determine whether important controls are 
absent. This criticism applies, of course, not just to Aboody et 
al. (1999) but also to all similar pricing studies. 
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of timing asset sales for income management pur- 
p o s e ~ . ’ ~ , ”  
One interesting study of Danish banks, Bernard 
et al. (1995), focuses on the impact of fair value 
accounting on bank regulatory capital as opposed 
to the value relevance of fair values for investors. 
Denmark is an interesting research setting because 
Danish bank regulators have used mark-to-market 
accounting to measure regulatory capital for a long 
period of time. Bernard et al. (1995) find that al- 
though there is evidence of earnings management, 
there is no reliable evidence that ‘mark-to-market’ 
numbers are managed to avoid regulatory capital 
constraints.18 In addition, when compared to US 
banks, Danish banks’ mark-to-market net equity 
book values are more reliable estimates of their eq- 
uity market values, thereby providing indirect evi- 
dence that fair value accounting could be 
beneficial to US investors and  depositor^.'^ 
3.3. US-based stock option research 
As noted above, estimates of employee stock op- 
tions fair values have been required to be disclosed 
for several years under SFAS No. 123. Several 
studies examine the value relevance of such dis- 
closures, including Bell et al. (2002),Aboody et a]. 
(2004), and Landsman et al. (2006). Findings in 
Bell et al. (2002) differ somewhat from those in 
Aboody et al. (2004), although both studies pro- 
vide evidence that employee option expense is 
value relevant to investors. Landsman et al. (2006) 
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provide theoretical and empirical support for 
measuring the fair value of employee stock option 
grants beyond grant date, with changes in fair 
value recognised in income along with amortisa- 
tion of grant date fair value. 
Because quoted prices for employee stock op- 
tions typically are not available because of non- 
tradability provisions, the fair value estimates are 
based on models that rely on inputs selected by re- 
porting firms. Aboody et al. (2006) find evidence 
that firms select model inputs so as to manage the 
pro forma income number disclosed in the em- 
ployee stock option footnote. This finding is po- 
tentially relevant to accounting standard-setters as 
well as bank regulators in that it is additional evi- 
dence that managers facing incentives to manage 
earnings are likely to do so when fair values must 
be estimated using entity-supplied estimates of 
values or model inputs if quoted prices for assets 
or liabilities are not readily available.2O If man- 
agers have the incentive to use discretion when es- 
timating fair values of on- and off-balance sheet 
asset and liability amounts when such values are 
not recognised in the financial statements, it is rea- 
sonable to assume the incentive will only increase 
if fair value accounting is used for recognition of 
amounts on the balance sheet and in the income 
statement. 
I h  In another study using the same sample of firms as that 
used in Muller and Riedl (2002), Dietrich et a]. (2001) find 
that UK investment property firms in the pre-1993 period ap- 
pear to select the valuation approach - historical cost or fair 
value - that results in smoother earnings. Because post-I993 
UK firms were required to disclose income from property 
sales separately on the income statement, the authors interpret 
this as evidence that changes in disclosure requirements al- 
tered manager’s use of property sales to smooth earnings. 
Dietrich et al. (2001) also find evidence that property apprais- 
al estimates of fair value better reflect asset selling prices than 
historical costs, and interpret this as evidence consistent with 
greater reliability of fair value estimates, at least with respect 
to assets that are ultimately disposed. 
See Lin and Peasnell (2000) for a discussion of manage- 
rial strategic considerations in the timing asset revaluations. 
The study provides evidence that firms appear to time asset 
revaluations to offset the effects of so-called equity depletion 
arising from immediate write-off of goodwill. 
Ix The ability to mark-to-market an asset suggests the exis- 
tence of a reasonably liquid market for the asset. From this 
perspective, mark-to-market values can be viewed as approx- 
imating Level 1 or Level 2 fair value estimates. 
l 9  Bernard et al. (1995) caution that drawing inferences 
from the Danish experience with fair value accounting for 
banks regarding the benefits of requiring fair value accounting 
for US banks is subject to many caveats. These include differ- 
ences in the relative size of the US and Danish banking sec- 
tors, as well as relative differences in US and Danish banking 
regulatory systems. 
2o See also the discussion above of the Barth et al. (1996) 
findings relating to loans fair values estimates by banks with 
lower regulatory capital. 
4. Fair value implementation issues 
Estimating fair value, i.e., exit value, for assets and 
liabilities is relatively easy if they are actively 
traded in liquid markets. The problem becomes 
more complicated if active markets do not exist, 
which is why the FASB offers Level 2 and Level 3 
estimation categories in SFAS 157. Although ab- 
sence of active markets is an obvious problem for 
non-financial assets, the problem is no less obvi- 
ous for financial instruments, particularly if the fi- 
nancial instrument is a compound instrument 
comprising several embedded option-like features, 
values for which depend on inter-related default 
and price risk characteristics. 
In this section, I discuss issues relating to imple- 
mentation of fair value estimates when market 
prices for particular financial instruments are not 
readily available by focusing on findings from two 
related studies by Barth et al. (1998, 2000) on the 
use of binomial option pricing models to estimate 
fair values for corporate debt and its components. 
The issues I discuss should provide some insights 
to the FASB and IASB regarding the relevance and 
reliability of Level 3 fair value estimates. 
4.1. Binomial option pricing of corporate debt 
Barth et al. (1998) uses a binomial option pric- 
ing model to estimate the fair values of corporate 
debt and its components, i.e., conversion, call, put, 
and sinking fund features, to provide evidence on 
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the relevance and reliability of estimated fair val- 
ues. A companion study, Barth et al. (2000), de- 
scribes details of how the binomial model is 
implemented. The 1998 empirical study is based 
on data from 1990 for a sample of 120 publicly 
traded US firms that have corporate debt with mul- 
tiple embedded option features. The binomial 
model the study implements is based on the mod- 
els of Cox et al. (1979) and Rendleman and Bartter 
(1979), and considers directly only default risk, 
but includes information in the interest rate yield 
curve. 
Findings from Barth et al. (1 998) reveal compo- 
nent value estimates are relevant in that they rep- 
resent large fractions of estimated total bond fair 
value. In addition, implementing a fundamental 
components approach in which call options are 
classified as assets, conversion options as equity, 
and put options as debt, indicates there are materi- 
al changes to recognised balance sheet accounts 
and debt-to-equity ratios for sample firms?’ The 
study also finds that estimates of component fair 
values depend on whether a bond has multiple fea- 
tures. For example, the value of the conversion 
feature for a convertible, callable bond depends on 
the value of the call feature and vice versa. In ad- 
dition, because components’ values are interde- 
pendent, the order in which components are 
considered when estimating each bond’s total fair 
value can materially affect each component’s esti- 
mated fair value. This issue is particularly impor- 
tant if a fundamental components approach is used 
for separate recognition of bond components as as- 
sets, liabilities, and equity. 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
However, additional evidence in Barth et al. 
(1998) suggests model estimates of total bond 
value may lack reliability. In particular, when the 
authors re-estimate bond fair values excluding 
from the sample those bonds with available market 
prices (such bonds comprise approximately half of 
sample bonds), estimated bond values for those 
bonds that are not publicly traded differ signifi- 
cantly from value estimates when all bonds are in- 
cluded in the estimation procedure. This finding 
suggests that financial instruments’ fair value esti- 
mates are sensitive to whether actual market price 
information from other instruments an entity has 
on its balance sheet is available for use as model 
inputs. 
Barth et al. (1998) reach several conclusions re- 
garding limitations to implementation of binomial 
option pricing models for estimating bond fair val- 
ues that generalise to all financial instruments is- 
sued or held by an entity. First, the authors had to 
make several educated guesses for values of model 
inputs (e.g., conversion schedules and equity 
volatility). In principle, managers of the reporting 
entities likely have access to better information 
than financial statement users (including academic 
researchers), and the authors suggest that fair 
value estimates could improve if firms were re- 
quired to disclose them?* Second, models quickly 
become too complex and difficult to implement if 
they are to incorporate all of the dimensions of risk 
and value that can affect an instrument’s fair value. 
For example, presently, few models consider both 
interest rate and default risk. In addition, financial 
instruments’ fair values are interdependent. For 
example, the fair value of one debt instrument is- 
sued by an entity is dependent upon actions that 
holders of another debt instrument issued by that 
entity can take. The model Barth et al. (1998) im- 
plement considers some sources of bond value in- 
terdependence (e.g., debt priority) but basically 
ignores the issue because of its complexity. The 
issue of financial instruments’ value interdepend- 
ence is another illustration of the issue raised by 
Barth and Landsman ( 1995) that a financial instru- 
ment’s fair value - i.e., its exit value - may not ad- 
equately capture the value of the instrument to the 
entity that owns it. When an asset’s value-in-use 
departs significantly from its exit value because of 
value interdependence, fair value will be less in- 
formative to investors who are using the informa- 
tion to value the entity’s equity. 
4.2. Manipulation of model inputs 
Having to rely on managers’ estimates of asset 
and liability fair values introduces the general 
problem of informational asymmetry.*’ That is, in 
the case of Level 3 fair value estimates, managers 
have private information regarding appropriate 
values to select for model inputs as well the true 
See FASB (1990, 2000) for a description of the funda- 
mental components approach to accounting for complex fi- 
nancial instruments. In addition to the FASB, several other 
standard-setters have considered or require separating com- 
pound financial instruments into components, including the 
CICA (Section 3860 of the CfCA Handbook, ‘Financial 
Instruments - Disclosure and Presentation’) and the AASB 
(AASB Accounting Standard 1033, Presentation and 
Disclosure of Financial fnstrunients). Under the revised ver- 
sion of IAS 32 (IASB, 2003a), firms that issue compound fi- 
nancial instruments with debt and equity components must 
account for, and present separately, the components according 
to their substance based on the definitions of liability and eq- 
uity. 
?2 Relatedly, as noted above. Cotter and Richardson (2002) 
also suggest managers have superior information about non- 
investment property values and therefore rely on director esti- 
mates of fair value rather than appraisals for these assets. 
However, this does not preclude requiring managers to dis- 
close assumptions they make as inputs to the valuation 
process. 
?? This is not to suggest that informational asymmetry is pe- 
culiar to fair value estimation by managers. Informational 
asymmetry arises in accounting whenever managers have dis- 
cretion regarding the timing or amount of non-market adjust- 
ments to amounts arising from past transactions, e.g.. 
allowances bad debt, allowances for loan losses, and impair- 
ment charges. 
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underlying economic value of an asset (or liabili- 
ty) to the firmF4 Informational asymmetry creates 
two somewhat different problems, adverse selec- 
tion and moral hazard. 
An important implication of adverse selection is 
that the market will tend to value apparently simi- 
lar, but different, assets held by two firms similar- 
ly when assessing their fair values and the values 
of the firms’ equities. Thus, for example, in the ab- 
sence of credible and verifiable information, two 
property investment firms that are otherwise 
equivalent except one has a higher quality portfo- 
lio of investments than the other will have their 
stocks valued similarly by the securities market. 
How can the firm with the higher quality portfolio 
of investments signal its fair value estimates are a 
more reliable indicator of economic value? One 
solution is for the firm to sell a portion of its port- 
folio to establish that the selling price is close to 
the fair value estimate of the property sold. 
Another solution is to permit the firm to disclose 
its valuation assumptions, the quality of which can 
be verified by others. For example, the firm can se- 
lect a high cost external appraiser to value its prop- 
erties. Both of these solutions illustrate the same 
point: for the signal to be credible, it must be cost- 
ly, but less costly for the property investment firm 
with the higher quality investment portfolio. The 
investment firm with the lower quality portfolio 
could mimic the actions of the higher quality firm, 
but doing so would be more costly as the market 
would learn its portfolio of investments was of 
lower q~al i ty .2~ 
The problem of moral hazard is that managers 
will tend to use their private information to their 
personal advantage by manipulating the informa- 
tion that they disclose to the securities markets and 
regulators. For example, under a fair value meas- 
urement regime, managers have the incentive to 
value assets upward to increase income and their 
bonus-based compensation, and to time any im- 
pairments or upward revaluation reversals to min- 
imise the effect on their compensation, e.g., in a 
period when the firm’s income is otherwise de- 
pressed and the manager will not get any bonus re- 
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gardless. This is the so-called ‘big bath’ problem. 
As noted above, the findings in Aboody et al. 
(2006), which indicate that managers select model 
parameters to manage estimates of disclosed em- 
ployee stock option fair values, raise the broader 
question of whether managers will behave similar- 
ly when selecting model parameters for fair value 
estimates of other financial instruments, including 
those whose values are recognised in the body of 
the financial statements. The Barth et al. (1998) 
conclusion that managers can provide better esti- 
mates of bond fair values because they have access 
to private information, presumes implicitly that 
managers apply their private information in a neu- 
tral fashion - i.e., they do not succumb to the 
temptation to manipulate bond fair value estimates 
for private gain. 
If fair value accounting for financial instruments 
or non-financial assets is generally applied for fi- 
nancial statement recognition, accounting stan- 
dard-setters and securities regulators face the 
challenge of determining how much latitude to 
give managers when they estimate fair values, bal- 
ancing the benefit of permitting managers to reveal 
private information, thereby mitigating the adverse 
selection problem, and the moral hazard cost of 
their exercising discretion to manipulate earnings 
and balance sheet ratios that affect contracting re- 
lationships with lenders and, in the case of finan- 
cial institutions, financial statement-based 
regulatory capital used by bank regulators interest- 
ed in stability of the banking system. 
Although the securities market tends to act as a 
disciplinary force to keep firms and its managers 
honest, it does so with a lag. One solution ad- 
vanced here to the problem of balancing the ad- 
verse selection and moral hazard problems is to 
require extensive disclosure of the underlying as- 
sumptions used when estimating fair values, 
whether the fair value estimates be Level 1, 2, or 
3. For example, in the case of Level 2 estimates, 
investors should be provided with sufficient infor- 
mation to determine which assets or liabilities are 
used as a basis for comparison. In the case of Level 
3 estimates, investors should have access to all rel- 
evant model inputs. The FASB appears to require 
ample disclosure in SFAS 157. For example, re- 
garding Level 3 estimates the FASB (FASB, 
2006a, p. 12, para. 32) requires that ‘the reporting 
entity shall disclose information that enables users 
of its financial statements to assess the inputs used 
to develop those measurements and for recurring 
fair value measurements using significant unob- 
servable inputs (Level 3).’ Whether investors find 
SFAS 157 disclosures to be useful in assessing the 
relevance and reliability of the firms’ fair value 
estimates is an empirical matter that will undoubt- 
edly be the subject of much future study by ac- 
counting researchers. 
24 Managers also have private information regarding appro- 
priate Level 1 or Level 2 fair value estimates (see discussion 
of Cotter and Richardson, 2002, in footnote 22). 
25 One can view the election of fair value or historical cost 
(with impairment) measurement that was permitted under UK 
GAAP as an opportunity for higher quality firms to signal 
their quality through the selection of fair value. For example, 
suppose both a high quality and low quality property invest- 
ment firm selected fair value measurement and revalued their 
assets by the same amount. The firm with the lower quality 
property investment portfolio would be more likely to reverse 
the revaluation in future years, which would hurt the firm’s 
credibility with the financial markets, thereby reducing its in- 
centive to revalue its assets, and possibly avoid election of fair 
value measurement. 
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4.3.  Fair values measurement error 
One problem that remains even in the absence of 
managerial manipulation of fair value estimates is 
that fair value estimates of assets and liabilities are 
likely to contain measurement error. If the findings 
in Barth et al. (1995) relating to banks’ investment 
securities generalises to other bank assets and lia- 
bilities, implementation of a full fair value model 
for recognition of financial instruments at fair 
value could yield unrecognised gains/losses that 
could cause earnings (and, in the case of banks, 
regulatory capital) to be more volatile than earn- 
ings based on the current historical cost model. 
This would be expected to occur particularly if 
measurement error in assets’ fair values - which is 
likely to be positively correlated across assets - is 
not fully offset by measurement error in bank lia- 
bilities’ fair values. 
Of course, not all earnings volatility arising from 
the application of fair value accounting is the re- 
sult of measurement error. Barth (2004) makes the 
observation that there are three primary sources of 
‘extra’ volatility associated with fair value-based 
accounting amounts relative to those determined 
under historical cost. The first is true underlying 
economic volatility that is reflected by changes in 
the fair value of assets and liabilities. The second 
is volatility induced by measurement error in esti- 
mates of those fair value changes. The third, in- 
duced volatility arising from using a 
mixed-attribute model, would be less of a concern 
if all instruments are recognised at fair value, or if 
a firm elects the fair value option that is permitted 
under IAS 39. 
Before leaving the discussion of measurement 
error, it is important to note that although fair 
value estimates of assets and liabilities likely con- 
tain measurement error relative to true economic 
values, so do historical cost-based book value esti- 
mates.26 The key question for policy makers and 
academic researchers alike is whether fair value- 
based financial statements improve information 
investors receive relative to information provided 
by historical cost-based financial statements. The 
overall conclusion from the research I review is 
that investors do indeed benefit from having ac- 
cess to fair value information. 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
future standards need to address. Taken together, 
the research findings suggest that disclosed and 
recognised fair values are informative to investors, 
but that the level of informativeness is affected by 
the amount of measurement error and source of the 
estimates - management or external appraisers. I 
also provide a discussion of implementation issues 
of determining asset and liability fair values. 
Fortunately for academic accounting re- 
searchers, the IASB and FASB continue to issue 
standards relating to fair value measurement, dis- 
closure, and recognition, providing ample oppor- 
tunity for future research. Findings from extant 
studies of firms in the US, UK, and Australian cap- 
ital markets suggest that investors are provided 
with information that is somewhat reliable and rel- 
evant. Whether relevance and reliability of asset 
and liability fair values improves with the new 
measurement and disclosure standards and with 
fair value recognition extended to a broader set of 
assets and liabilities than has been the case to date 
remains to be seen. In addition, because standards 
issued by the IASB either are or will be required to 
be adopted by firms in a great number of countries 
around the world, researchers will have an oppor- 
tunity to examine how the relevance and reliabili- 
ty of disclosed and recognised fair value amounts 
vary across the many countries, where depth of 
markets for assets and liabilities and other institu- 
tional features that can affect fair value estimates 
are likely to differ. 
5.  Concluding remarks 
This paper reviews the extant capital market liter- 
ature that examines the usefulness of fair value ac- 
counting information to investors. In doing so, I 
highlight findings that are of interest not just to ac- 
ademic researchers, but also to practitioners and 
standard-setters as they assess how current fair 
value standards require modification, and issues 
26 As noted above (footnote 23) .  historical cost-based esti- 
mates are also subject to managerial discretion. 
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